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LET TER 1
I'm sorry; I decline to contribute to your proposed book about the 'debate' over the law of non-contradiction. My feeling is that since this debate instantly reaches deadlock, there's really nothing much to say about it. To conduct a debate, one needs common ground; principles in dispute cannot of course fairly be used as common ground; and in this case, the principles not in dispute are so very much less certain than non-contradiction itself that it matters little whether or not a successful defence of non-contradiction could be based on them.
LET TER 2
Paraconsistency. I'm increasingly convinced that I can and do reason about impossible situations. ('Sylvan's Box' played a big part in persuading me.Ê) But I don't really understand how that works. Paraconsistent logic as developed by you and your allies is clear enough, but I find it a bit off the topic. For it allows (a limited amount of) reasoning about blatantly impossible situations. Whereas what I find myself doing is reasoning about subtly impossible situations, and rejecting suppositions that lead fairly to blatant impossibilities. In other words, I understand what it would be to do without rejection by reductio ad contradictionem altogether, but I don't understand what it is to be selective, using reductio É Priest (2002) .
Ê Priest (1997) .
sometimes and sometimes not. A (draft?) paper by DanielË seems promising, but maybe it just repackages my problem about what's the right similarity metric on possibilities together with impossibilities. Hard-line paraconsistency.Ì It still seems to me that we have a complete stalemate, just as I said in the passage you quote, about whether our world might, as far as we know, be contradictory. (By the way, I keep forgetting whether you'd rather say that contradictions are possible, or that for all we know we live in an impossible world. Do you have a uniform policy?Í) That doesn't stop me from sometimes making believe that impossibilities are possible, subtle ones at least. I agree with you about the many uses to which we could put make-believedly possible impossibilities, if we are willing to use them. The trouble is that all these uses seem to require a distinction between the subtle ones and the blatant ones (very likely context-dependent, very likely a matter of degree) and that's just what I don't understand.
